The recent pivot in U.S. foreign policy towards Russia, coupled with a diminished focus on Ukraine and its allies, has prompted European leaders to undertake a fundamental reassessment of their security needs.

The days of relying on dialogue and American military presence may be drawing to a close, necessitating a significant shift in Europe's approach to its defense and responsibilities regarding Ukraine.

An urgent meeting of the European Council on March 6 resulted in a foundational agreement among European governments to allocate resources for the expedited development of defensive capabilities, as well as support for Ukraine.

This agreement highlights that adequate funding is crucial for achieving real European security.

However, financial resources alone do not suffice.

European leaders must grapple with how to ensure Ukraine's security independently of U.S. support and how to bear the primary responsibility for their defense.

These objectives are complex and may take years to fulfill.

A growing number of voices suggest that European leaders should present an offer to the United States that is compelling enough to warrant its consideration.

Such an offer would likely need to include a two-pronged element: first, the commitment to deploy a substantial military force in Ukraine to deter future Russian aggression, which would form part of any ceasefire agreement; second, a clear timeline for transferring the primary defense responsibilities from the United States to Europe.

To substantively support negotiations aimed at ending the war, Europe should consider deploying four fully equipped armored brigades, supported by robust air power and essential combat assets, including air and missile defense systems.

This approach aims to both deter Russia and reassure Ukraine that any resumed hostilities would prompt immediate European intervention.

This commitment, however, should be conditional upon four key elements: Firstly, Ukraine must be included in any negotiations that lead to a ceasefire, with European nations ensuring full transparency regarding the negotiations' essence and outcomes.

Secondly, Ukraine's military capacity should not be constrained by any agreement or settlement with Russia, as ongoing Western support for Ukrainian armed forces remains vital for a sustainable peace.

The third condition stipulates that the European combat deployment should be under NATO command and control, even if the United States opts out of ground involvement, akin to the situations witnessed with other allies in previous operations.

Most European armed forces are trained and operated within the NATO framework, particularly in complex operational environments.

The United States has traditionally resisted efforts to establish parallel European command structures and has advocated for the integration of European combat capabilities within NATO.

Finally, the U.S. needs to maintain its commitment to Article 5 of NATO's charter, ensuring defense for Europe in the event of an armed attack against any member state.

Looking further ahead, it is imperative that Europe assumes primary responsibility for its defense.

Decades of under-investment in European defense capabilities have left the continent ill-prepared to take on a principal role, let alone a leadership position in its own defense.

European allies must establish a clear timeline for transferring defense responsibilities from the U.S. to Europe.

Specifically, by the end of 2025, European forces should replace the 20,000 U.S. troops that were deployed in Europe following the outbreak of hostilities between Russia and Ukraine in 2022. However, this commitment is predicated on the absence of European forces being concurrently deployed in Ukraine, as they would lack the capacity to fulfill both roles within the suggested timeline.

By the end of this decade, NATO's non-U.S. allies are expected to meet between 70% and 80% of the NATO rapid response force requirements in terms of strength and capabilities.

This includes the ability to deploy approximately 75,000 troops within 10 days, 225,000 additional troops within 30 days, and 400,000 additional troops within six months, all fully trained and equipped for sustainable high-intensity operations.

By the end of 2032, non-U.S. NATO allies should be capable of deploying 75% of all required advanced strategic assets.

Historically, the U.S. has supplied the majority of these vital NATO forces, including heavy airlift, air-to-air refueling, intelligence and targeting information, advanced surveillance and reconnaissance, integrated air and missile defense systems, and more.

To take on the primary defense responsibilities for Europe, European nations must acquire and redeploy these strategic assets to prepare for any contingencies.

Concurrently with these commitments, the U.S. should also agree to several corresponding obligations, including a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces in alignment with increasing European capabilities and commitments.

Moreover, the U.S. should commit to retaining a substantial share—though considerably reduced—of the collective defense burden, particularly through support of essential U.S. strategic assets that bolster NATO after Europe assumes primary responsibility for its defense.

Additionally, the U.S. should commit to leading the overall NATO command structure and all military commands (land, air, and maritime), integrating European leaders within the NATO framework, irrespective of any other leadership adjustments.

While Europe assumes a greater burden of NATO defense, it remains critical for the U.S. to provide the necessary leadership and control frameworks to sustain NATO cohesion.

Lastly, the U.S. must affirm its role in providing nuclear deterrence for NATO, including the continued deployment of nuclear forces in Europe as part of NATO nuclear sharing agreements.

The role of nuclear and non-nuclear allies is to reinforce this deterrent posture.

A new transatlantic deal is emerging, one in which Europe assumes principal responsibility for the continent's security while the United States facilitates this transition.

Although the White House may not be inclined to accept this timeline for transferring responsibilities, doing so could enhance Europe's commitment to its security and rejuvenate transatlantic relations.